This article examines arbitrage investment in a mispriced asset when the mispricing follows the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process and a credit-constrained investor maximizes a generalization of the Kelly criterion. The optimal differentiable and threshold policies are derived. The optimal differentiable policy is linear with respect to mispricing and risk-free in the long run. The optimal threshold policy calls for investing immediately when the mispricing is greater than zero with the investment amount inversely proportional to the risk aversion parameter. The investment is risky even in the long run. The results are consistent with the belief that creditconstrained arbitrageurs should be risk-neutral if they are to engage in convergence trading.
Introduction
Arbitrageurs are people who detect inconsistencies in asset prices and invest in them hoping that the inconsistencies will be eliminated -much as a cat detects a mouse hole and waits nearby in the hope a mouse will eventually come out. In both situations the waiting time is uncertain but the arbitrageur is at a disadvantage: While the cat relies only on its own abilities, the arbitrageur depends on the willingness of other people to lend him money, so the irrationality of creditors may lead to great debacles long before prices converge to consistent values. The notorious story of the arbitrage fund LTCM that lost 90 percent of its value on "riskless" deals illustrates the importance of credit constraints.
So what policy should the arbitrageur pursue when creditors impose borrowing constraints? In particular, can the arbitrageur allocate the available funds in such a way as to eliminate all the long-run risk? If this risk elimination is possible, the mispricings should be equally attractive to risk-averse as well as risk-neutral investors. However, a popular view asserts that arbitrageurs, unlike other investors, should be risk-neutral. Is there any ground for this belief? The present article provides a justification by solving for arbitrageurs' optimal policies under several types of constraints and showing that under some of them the long-run risk cannot be eliminated. Risk-averse investors that face those constraints are not interested in small mispricings.
The paper investigates two classes of constraints that lead to strikingly different results. Under constraints from the first class, the arbitrageur can only change the leverage slowly. In practice, borrowing additional funds takes time:
The arbitrageur must apply for new credit, provide an explanation why he needs it and wait for a decision. Depending on the situation, the process might take from several minutes to several days. In addition a rapid increase in a position adversely affects prices, so in their own interests arbitrageurs must accumulate positions slowly.
For this class of policies, the main result is that the optimal policy is linear in the mispricing, and independent of the coefficient of risk aversion. The variance of the portfolio wealth does not grow with time. Thus, under this constraint the long-run risk can be expunged.
Constraints of the second type are stronger: The arbitrageur cannot change leverage except by closing the position. The motivation is that the arbitrageur is often restricted in his ability to change the leverage -even if the need arises.
Higher leverage is mostly needed when mispricing is increasing and the investment account shows negative performance. Unfortunately, this is the worst time to ask for new credit because the creditors hate to invest in accounts with negative performance. As Mark Twain said: "A banker is a fellow who lends you his umbrella when the sun is shining but wants it back the minute it rains." For policies in this class, the main result is that the long-run risk cannot be completely removed. Consequently, the arbitrageur will invest an amount that is inversely proportional to his risk aversion.
These two examples suggest that what makes the convergence arbitrage risky in the long run is the inability of the arbitrageur to change the investment amount after the investment is committed. In particular, the results of the second example are consistent with the belief that arbitrageurs should be riskneutral if they are to engage in convergence trading.
The results of the present paper match closely with results of Grossman and Vila (1992) , who study the dynamic investment under a constraint on investment amount.
They find that the constraint essentially makes the investor behave as if he were more risk-averse than he actually is. Unlike in the present paper, however, the asset process is not mean-reverting in Grossman and Vila (1992) , so the investor could not hope to eliminate the risk completely. Also the constraint is not exogenous as in the present paper but a function of the investor's wealth.
Because of these differences it is difficult to conclude whether the similarity of results is incidental or not. Both papers, however, support the view that certain constraints increase long-run riskiness of investment projects.
Unlike Grossman and Vila (1992) , Kim and Omberg (1996) study mean-reverting price processes. They use finite-horizon utility functions and find a variety of possible patterns of investor behavior. In contrast, the present paper comes to more definite conclusions by using a generalization of the Kelly investment criterion, which emphasizes the long-run behavior of portfolios. The long-run criterion applies better than finite-horizon criteria to modelling objectives of large institutional traders. In addition, it makes the problem easier since it obviates the need for solving complicated partial differential equations.
In another recent paper about convergence trading, Liu and Longstaff (2000) use the Brownian bridge to model the mispricing process, an assumption on the process that requires a fixed horizon at which the mispricing will be effaced. By the nature of their model, they cannot draw conclusions about long-run risks but they do find that arbitrageurs sometimes cannot eliminate all risk at the end of the arbitrage period. This result is consistent with results of the present paper.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Sections 3 and 4 derive the optimal differentiable and threshold policies and describe their properties. Section 5 compares results for differentiable and threshold policies and concludes.
Model
In the model, mispricing of a security follows the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process:
where x t is mispricing at time t, z t is a standard Wiener process, σ > 0 and α > 0. Parameter α measures the speed of reversion to the correct price: The higher α is, the faster mispricing x drifts towards zero. Parameter σ measures the size of new mispricing shocks introduced into the process. It is also useful to define Σ = σ 2 /(2α), which is the variance of x t in the long run.
Changes in mispricing induce changes in the arbitrageur's wealth through his choice of the leverage coefficient f (x): The change in the logarithm of wealth is the product of the leverage coefficient and the change in the mispricing,
Intuitively, a 1% change in the mispricing results in a f (x)% change in the investor's wealth.
The arbitrageur's utility is a linear combination of the growth rates in the expectation and variance of the portfolio wealth:
where parameter γ measures risk aversion of the investor. The optimization problem is to choose the leverage function f (x) so that utility U is maximized.
What is the meaning of this maximization criterion? If γ is 0, then the criterion is the same as the criterion of maximizing the portfolio's long-run growth rate -the Kelly criterion. When γ > 0, it introduces an additional term penalizing deviations from the expected growth rate. This additional term assures the investor that maximizing U protects him against the large deviations in the realized growth of his portfolio from the expectations.
An example may perhaps add some insight into the investment criterion.
Suppose that the wealth of the investor follows a geometric Brownian motion with constant parameters µ and σ. Then the utility of the investor is
This expression shows that the utility depends only on the parameters of the process and on risk aversion but not on the investment horizon. An important assumption that we adopt in this generalization is that the investor is concerned only with long-run consequences of his policy. This assumption simplifies the analysis considerably and appears to be realistic for small investments by large institutions. In using this assumption we follow Bielecki and Pliska (1999) and Bielecki et al. (2000) , who applied it to the analysis of continuous investment policies in a similar situation.
Optimal Differentiable Policy
This section is about differentiable policies f (x), for which f ∈ C 1 (−∞, +∞), and (5)
The policies from this class will be called D−policies. This class excludes policies that prescribe extremely rapid growth of leverage with respect to mispricing. The following theorem is a cardinal ingredient in showing that optimal D−policies are linear.
Theorem 3.1 Linear investment policies are the only D−policies such that the variance of the logarithm of wealth u t is asymptotically constant.
The proof uses a convenient representation for u: Let
Then it is easy to check that
The intuition behind this representation is simple. The investor can increase his wealth only if he increases his leverage when the mispricing increases. The derivative f ′ (x) measures the sensitivity of the leverage policy to mispricing, and (8) shows that the change in the logarithm of wealth equals a multiple of the integral of f ′ (x) plus a stationary process. The more sensitive the leverage policy is to mispricing, the greater the increase in the wealth induced by local variations in mispricing. The addition of g(x t ) − g(x 0 ) reflects dependence of the wealth on the initial and final conditions.
Proof of Theorem 3.1: Taking the variance of u t − u 0 in (8) gives
As t increases, all terms except possibly the third one tend to a finite limit. So, asymptotically,
where
The rate r = 0 if and only if Var(f
According to Proposition A.1 in Appendix A, Corr(f
follows from (12) that Proof: Let the non-linear policy be f (x). According to (8), in the long run
Take the linear policy f L (x) = (E(f ′ (x)) − ε)x with ε > 0. For a certain ε it is admissible. This is because |E(f ′ (x)) − ε| < K follows from |f ′ (x)| ≤ K everywhere and |f ′ (x)| < K on a set of positive measure, which are both true because f is a non-linear D−policy. The expectation of the logarithm of wealth
It is clearly higher than the corresponding expectation for the non-linear policy.
From Theorem 3.1 we know that the variance of u t is asymptotically constant for linear policies and is asymptotically equivalent to rt, where r > 0, for non-linear policies. It follows that for sufficiently large T the linear policy f L will have lower Var(u T ) than the non-linear policy f . Thus f L asymptotically dominates f . QED.
It remains to find the optimal policy in the class of linear policies. It turns out that it is the policy that has the maximal sensitivity to mispricing. This is intuitively clear because every linear strategy eliminates the long-run risk, and the policy with the largest sensitivity to mispricing has the highest expected return. Formally, the following theorem holds.
Theorem 3.3
The optimal linear D−policy is f (x) = −Kx.
Proof: it is easy to compute
Thus, the utility is maximized by the maximal possible k, from which the theorem follows. QED.
The theorem implies that the arbitrageur should increase the leverage at the maximal possible rate. In particular, the optimal strategy does not depend on the risk aversion parameter or properties of the mispricing process. The intuitive meaning of this conclusion is that the appropriate use of leverage allows the arbitrageur to eliminate all the long run risk. As the next section shows, this conclusion will be reversed if the arbitrageur is more constrained in the use of leverage.
Optimal Threshold Policy
When an arbitrageur uses threshold policies he keeps his finger on a button that triggers investment while looking at the computer monitor and waiting for a mispricing. If he observes a mispricing that exceeds a threshold, S, he pushes the button and a fixed amount, L, is directed to this opportunity. When the mispricing falls below another threshold, s, he pushes another button and the position closes. Leverage L never changes when the position is opened. Simple threshold policies have equal thresholds: S = s.
As was said in the Introduction, arbitrageurs use threshold policies because they often cannot secure additional funds for positions they already opened.
They also favor threshold policies because these policies allow economizing on transaction costs.
General threshold policies are complicated to analyze. Fortunately, the following theorem shows that it is sufficient to study simple threshold policies. The relevant properties of the simple threshold policies are described in the next theorem, which uses the following notation:
For S = 0, the value of ψ(S) can be computed explicitly: ψ(0) = 2 ln 2/(α √ 2πΣ).
Theorem 4.2 For the simple threshold policy with threshold S and leverage L
The proof is relegated to Appendix B.
The first step in obtaining the optimal policy from this theorem is to calculate reduced utility function that depends only on threshold S :
Corollary 1 For a fixed threshold S the optimal leverage is
and the corresponding utility is
The functions L(S) and U (S) are illustrated in Figures 1 and 2 . We can see that higher long-run variance Σ leads to an increase in both leverage L and utility U . Higher persistence of the process does not change optimal leverage but decreases utility. The function ψ(S) is increasing in S 2 , and consequently the maximal utility is reached at S = 0. The optimal threshold policy is given in the following theorem.
Theorem 4.3 Utility is maximized for S = 0 and L = π/(4γ ln 2). The optimal utility is U = α √ 2πΣ/(8γ ln 2).
Predictably, the utility is higher when the convergence is fast (α is high) and the arbitrage opportunity is large (Σ is high). Not so predictable is that the optimal leverage does not depend on the parameters of the process: This leverage optimally balances risk and return for every Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process. What is most important, however, is that the optimal leverage depends on the parameter of the risk aversion γ. The higher γ is, the lower the amount is that the arbitrageur is willing to commit to the arbitrage opportunity: The arbitrageur that uses only threshold strategies is unable to remove the long-run risk and must adjust his behavior.
Section 3 shows that in the class of differentiable policies with bounded derivative the optimal policy is linear in the mispricing and the coefficient in the linear relationship is the highest possible. The optimal strategy in this case does not depend on the risk-aversion of the arbitrageur, and all the long-run risk can be eliminated.
In contrast, according to the results of Section 4, if only threshold policies are available then the long-run risk is unavoidable and the investment is inversely proportional to risk aversion. This conclusion is consistent with the belief that arbitrageurs are typically risk-neutral. The suggested reason for this belief is that the constraints on flexibility of changes in leverage make the convergence trading risky even in the long run.
A Auxiliary Statistical Result
Suppose that x and y are jointly Gaussian random variables, Var(x) = Var(y) = 1, and Cov(x, y) = β. Proof: Represent f (x) as a sum of Hermite polynomials:
where by definition
Hermite polynomials form an orthonormal system with respect to the Gaussian kernel and possess the following useful property:
Using this property and orthonormality, we can write
From (21) and (22), the maximum of Cov(f (x), f (y)) is β and it is achieved by
The minimum is β N and it is achieved by f (x) = H N (x).
QED.
B Proof of Theorem 4.2
Proof: By definition, the threshold policy is
The generalized Ito formula gives
where δ S is the Dirac delta-function and
The intuition behind this representation is simple: The investor increases his wealth only when he triggers the policy. The number of times the policy is triggered is stochastic and measured by the integral of the delta function. The profit earned at each occasion is proportional to the product of local volatility σ 2 and leverage L. Finally, there is a dependence of wealth on initial and final conditions which is captured by g(x t ) − g(x 0 ).
Since g(x t ) does not grow with time, the arbitrageur's utility depends only on the moments of the integral of the delta function:
The first step in the computation of the moments is calculating the expectation and covariance function of the generalized stochastic process δ t,S =: δ S (x t ).
The joint density of x t1 and x t2 is p(x 1 , x 2 ) =1 ∆ χ [S,S+∆] , where χ A denotes the characteristic function of set A and ∆ limits to 0. Then, computing two first moments for χ [S,S+∆] (x t ) and taking the limit ∆ → 0 give the following formulas:
E(δ t1,S δ t2,S ) = 1 2πΣ 1 − a(τ ) 2 exp − S
For example, equality (29) can be seen from the following calculation:
E(δ t1,S δ t2,S ) = lim 
From (28) and (29) 
Since Cov(δ t1,S , δ t2,S ) depends only on τ = t 2 − t 1 , it can be denoted by ϑ(τ , S). 
This implies all the assertions of the theorem. QED.
